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 1 
Preface 
This is the first of two ‘policy insight’ papers that offer an outline of strategies and policies for an 
innovative, sustainable and low-carbon approach to China’s development. They are intended to inform 
decision-making for China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). The two papers were originally prepared 
before the Covid-19 outbreak; the pandemic has changed the situation in many important ways, inside 
and outside China. The fundamentals of the medium- to long-term analyses of these papers have not 
changed. However, the short term is very different and it will be important to integrate, both in China 
and the world, the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis with the transformation of the economy embodied in 
the transition to a low and zero-carbon world. 
The world economy is now at risk, with the prospect of a strong contraction in both demand and supply 
this year. Global supply chains are facing severe challenges as many countries have imposed social 
quarantine, lockdowns and travel bans. In response to the crisis we must ensure that lessons from the 
2008 financial crash are learned: the recovery from that crash did not embody strong enough priorities 
for sustainability and there was a rapid relapse into austerity in a number of countries. 
The Covid-19 pandemic is a crisis both for the world and for China. Unprecedented measures were taken 
in China to contain the virus, which reversed the escalation of cases and brought the medical emergency 
under control. At the time of writing China is stepping into the next phase, with lockdowns beginning to 
be lifted and the focus shifted to economic recovery; meanwhile, most countries around the world are 
still in the first two phases: managing the health crisis and preventing the collapse of the economy and 
deep damage to vulnerable groups. 
As one of the first countries entering the recovery phase, China will lead the way. The aim should surely 
be to build a better and more sustainable world. As we emerge out of the Covid-19 crisis we must not 
deepen another, bigger and more long-lasting crisis – climate change. If a short-term stimulus were to be 
concentrated mainly on traditional industries and infrastructure, ramping up fossil fuel consumption and 
locking in decades of polluting and high-carbon development, the consequences for China and the world 
would be devastating. 
As China leads the world out of the Covid-19 crisis, there is a great opportunity. China can show how 
urgent recovery measures can also accelerate the transition to the inevitable zero-carbon economy. The 
commitment of the world to tackling climate change will depend on what China does in the coming 
months and years. This influence is much more than China’s size; it comes also from its technologies, its 
strategies and its implementation. China now has a real possibility, and arguably a responsibility, not 
only to make its recovery a turning point in its own path to sustainable, inclusive and resilient 
development but also to lead the global fight against climate change and to build a better and more 
sustainable world. It is a crucial moment. These ideas will be developed in the third paper of this series. 
21 April 2020 
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Summary  
Old approaches to development are coming to an end  
China has transformed since its reform and opening-up strategy was launched in 1978 but now we must 
recognise that the old growth story is coming to an end. The phase of development driven by investment 
in physical capital will be increasingly supplanted by investment in assets such as knowledge and social 
capital as well as investment in and the preservation of natural capital.  
An attempt by China at high-carbon growth over the medium or long-term is not a feasible option. It 
would create an environment so hostile that it would likely reverse development and lead to decline or 
collapse. Even before this, China would lose competitive advantage in deploying and developing the new 
resource-efficient technologies on which the world will increasingly depend. And it could perpetuate or 
aggravate the very serious problems of air, water and soil pollution.  
The key challenges to be addressed in the next few decades are: 
• Climate change: As one of the world’s major emitters of carbon dioxide, China must play a 
significant role in the fight against climate change. In 30 to 50 years from now the world must 
have net-zero carbon emissions if it is to have a reasonable chance of achieving the Paris 
Agreement targets. China must also be close to net-zero-carbon for the world as a whole to meet 
this goal. 
• New technologies: It is critical that China prioritises the right technologies and provides strong 
policies and the right kind of finance to support technology development. At the same time, there 
could be major potential disruptions and risks to labour markets and it is crucial to ensure a just 
transition and that vulnerable groups are not left behind.  
• The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): It is important for China to define more clearly the concept of 
BRI, narrowing its priorities and clarifying its scope, and to share information with BRI countries 
within a transparent and understanding partnership. 
• Other challenges: China’s changing geo-economics around the world, continued uncertainties 
around trade and investment, and domestic economic structural changes present further 
challenges and should form the focus of short- or medium-term policies. The short-term impact 
of the Covid-19 virus layers on additional challenges while also creating opportunities to rethink 
ways of working. 
What should China’s new growth story look like? 
China’s new growth story in the medium to long term should be: 
i) sustainable, which means offering the next generation opportunities at least as good as those 
available to the current generation;  
ii) inclusive, addressing emerging challenges, promoting innovations and creating opportunities  
for all; 
iii) low-carbon, which requires actions on climate change, targeting a net zero-carbon economy 
within several decades;  
iv) market-oriented, offering a fair and transparent investment climate for the private sector. 
A new growth strategy for the new era  
China’s 14th Plan (2021–25) will, in large measure, chart the course for the new era in the country. China 
has highlighted structural reform within the new growth model and concentrated on various types of 
capital other than physical capital, as well as innovation and technology. As such, China will transform 
itself again in the next 30 to 40 years. 
The new growth strategy must embrace the challenges and opportunities of new technologies, changing 
economic geography and sustainability. And it must tackle the challenges of its public finances – China 
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has strong spending needs associated with urbanisation, infrastructure, education and health – and of 
social security and changing demography. The speed of technological change and a slowing in the overall 
growth rate imply that changing the composition of the economy can no longer occur simply through 
some sectors growing more rapidly than others: some sectors and places will decline in the coming years. 
Such transitions need to be well managed to ensure social cohesion and economic justice. There are 
many ways to achieve this, involving training, targeted finance, appropriate location of government 
activities, and provision of adequate social protection.  
The key areas for investment and innovation in China will be: new technologies that can give high-quality 
growth; modern service sectors, including health, education, transport, communications and IT, finance, 
and logistics; the functioning of modern cities, including in their infrastructure and in relation to 
pollution, congestion and efficiency; and food and land-use systems. Overall resource productivity and 
efficiency will be crucial and there is real potential in the idea of the circular economy with its emphasis 
on design for re-use and recycling. Investment in the four key capitals – human, social, physical and 
natural – must move to centre stage in the 14th Plan. 
The 14th Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative have to be understood together. China must take its 
decisions with careful thought over how its BRI partners will be taking theirs, and what forms the 
partnerships will take. China also has a real and vital opportunity to help the BRI countries to move 
towards a much more sustainable, more efficient and greener form of development by sharing the 
lessons of its recent past. And to some extent, China with its more advanced technologies will now play 
the role of an external partner to poorer countries, both within and outside the BRI.  
Economy-wide reforms that foster and promote the new growth strategy 
We set out six areas of reform, which are complementary and interwoven: 
i) Price, regulation and enterprise reform. If private sector investment and innovation are to be 
fostered within a strong and sound investment climate, then both price signals and regulation 
should take account of potential market failures. An example would be a strong carbon price. 
ii) Financing investment in the four forms of capital. This will require a combination of private and 
public finance. Wise regulation is of great importance, for avoiding both the problems of excessive 
risk-taking and the potential distortions and risk of directed credit. 
iii) Public finance and the functioning of cities. Cities will be the focus of most of the investments, 
particularly infrastructure investments, of the new era and their public finances must be 
managed well. To do this they will need strong revenue streams from local taxation and payments 
for services. 
iv) Internal governance. Private investment is at the heart of the growth model of the new era and it 
is very sensitive to the quality of governance, as well as the quality of infrastructure services. We 
identify three elements of the quality of governance in relation to investment: the soundness of 
policies; the predictability of policies; and the functioning and behaviour of institutions. 
v) Management of radical change and dislocation. Key elements include: training and retraining; 
support and finance for local entrepreneurship; moving mobile government activities to the 
affected localities; help for workers in relocating; and social safety nets. 
vi) Global governance. The challenges of the global commons, particularly climate change, are of 
great urgency. China is now in the vanguard of action and international collaboration on climate 
change. This presents it with great opportunities in terms of its own new model of growth but also 
in terms of global leadership. 
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Introduction  
China’s economy has seen rapid development ever since its reform and opening-up strategy was 
launched in 1978. Strong economic expansion over the past four decades has taken China from low-
income to upper-middle-income status.1 Looking back at the transformation that China has made, 
however, we must recognise that the old growth story is coming to an end. The phase of development 
driven by investment in physical capital will be increasingly supplanted by investment in assets such as 
knowledge and social capital as well as investment in and the preservation of natural capital.  
Over the past 40 years, major investments in physical and human capital yielded a dramatic 10-fold 
increase in per capita output. Over the coming 40 years, major investments in natural and social capital, 
alongside strong but redirected investment in physical and human capital could yield dramatic advances 
in wellbeing. 
Relationships between China and its trading partners, especially those in the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), will evolve to reflect the changing international division of labour in a rapidly changing world 
(Hepburn and Stern, 2018). China will focus on the technologies with high-quality growth prospects: 
modern service sectors, including health, education, transport, communications and IT, artificial 
intelligence, finance, logistics, sustainable urban infrastructure and new food and land-use systems. With 
today’s technologies, China can help BRI countries2 embark on a much more sustainable, more efficient 
and greener form of development, avoiding historical problems of pollution and congestion, with China 
itself moving up the value chain at the same time.   
Recognising the challenges that China is facing, with this paper we aim to offer an approach to growth 
and development that could spell out a new development strategy for the country as the 21st century 
progresses. This is not a story of some long-run model of growth: it is a plan for a transformation in the 
next two or three decades in a changing world. We argue that an attempt at high-carbon growth over 
the medium or long-term is not a feasible option. It would create an environment so hostile that it would 
likely reverse development and lead to decline or collapse. Even before this, China would lose competitive 
advantage in deploying and developing the new resource-efficient technologies on which the world will 
increasingly depend. And it could perpetuate or aggravate the very serious problems of air, water and soil 
pollution.  
Plan of the paper 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the economic achievement that China has made 
and looks forward in relation to climate and sustainability and challenges in a new era. It also outlines 
the desired features of the new growth story. In Section 2 we explain the reasons why the earlier 
approaches of development are coming to an end and set out briefly some of the central elements of the 
new growth strategy in a changing world. Section 3 outlines the core action areas, innovations and 
investments for the next phase, in particular China’s 14th Plan (2021–25) and the broad policy 
instruments to guide these innovations and investments. More detailed studies for investment in the four 
capitals to manage a structural transition will be covered in the next paper in this series (Stern et al., 
2020, forthcoming). The final section sets out the economy-wide reforms that can underpin the 
processes of transformation and growth that we describe.  
                                                
1 World Bank classifications. 
2 See OECD (2018) for information about the Belt and Road countries. 
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1. China’s economic growth: history, trends, 
challenges and the future 
Prior to 1978, China had maintained a central planning economy for 30 years. During this time a large 
share of the country’s economic output was directed and controlled by the central government, which 
set production goals, controlled prices and allocated resources across most of the economy. In other 
words, it was the Government, rather than the free market, that determined what to produce, how to 
produce it and for whom. This economic system led to many issues, including products that were difficult 
to adapt to ever-changing social needs, resulting in the existence of both insufficient and excess supply; 
a government that worked as the sole resource mobiliser and the promoter of economic and social 
development, suppressing the enthusiasm and creativity of enterprises; and a lack of competition and 
low efficiency. 
The Chinese economic reform (known as the reform and opening-up), led by Deng Xiaoping, started in 
December 1978. China developed a model described as ‘crossing the river by touching the stones’ to get 
reform done step by step. From 1978, China set up several special economic zones, such as Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai, to carry out pilot projects. Successful experience and practices from these were then spread 
more broadly. The late 1970s also saw key reforms in agricultural and household institutions; the 1980s 
brought support for entrepreneurship, township and village enterprises and more support for special 
economic zones. In the 1990s the financial sector was reformed with the growth of specialist banks and 
the creation of development banks, and in the 2000s the focus moved to human capital, with shifts in 
education and greater provision of social insurance. Throughout, there has been increasing emphasis on 
market mechanisms and on interaction with the world economy. 
China has transitioned from low-income to upper-middle-income status in the past four decades as the 
result of these sequential and structured reforms – an extraordinary achievement. This outcome has been 
aided by each set of reforms being tailored to the next phase of China’s development, taking into 
account lessons from the experience of earlier phases, current and likely future circumstances, and any 
adjustment of goals.  
This rapid growth has highlighted the “high input, high consumption, high emission and low efficiency” 
nature of China’s economy (Yang and Zhao, 2018). Chow and Li (2002) show that the average annual 
rate of growth was 9.7 per cent between 1978 and 1998 and suggest that 55 per cent of this growth 
came from the increase in physical capital. As observed by Qi et al. (2016) and others, China’s rapid 
economic growth has been fuelled by coal, and it is unlikely that economic growth over the period 1981–
2015 would have been as fast without such high levels of coal use.  
China has realised that the old growth story is not sustainable. As the country moves towards the ‘new 
normal’, which features a consistently slower rate of growth, China is highlighting structural reform 
within the new growth model and is concentrating on various types of capital other than physical 
capital, as well as innovation and technology (Song et al., 2017). As such, China will transform itself 
again in the next 30 to 40 years, when it will move to high-income status, but the dimensions of the 
transformation will not be so focused on output and income. The indications are that wellbeing, social 
and environmental quality and sustainability will be centre stage instead. All of China’s major 
transformations and sets of reforms have been of great importance, but such are the strengths of 
lessons from the past, and the magnitude of changes on the global stage, that this next set of reforms is 
of special significance, not only for China but also for the world. 
Challenges to be addressed in the next few decades 
i) Climate change  
There is growing evidence suggesting that the threat of irreversible climate change must compel 
immediate international action to control carbon emissions. For example, Lenton et al. (2019) summarise 
evidence on the threat of exceeding tipping points, such as ice collapse and biosphere boundaries, 
arguing that we are in a state of planetary emergency. According to the United Nations Environment 
 6 
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 2019, the forecast gap in emissions in 2030 between where 
the world is likely to be and where it needs to be to have a chance of limiting global warming to 2oC is 13 
to 15 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e), which is about 50 per cent larger than the gap 
in 2020 (UNEP, 2019). Ambition and action over the past decade have simply been inadequate globally; 
action now needs to be faster and more transformational. As one of the world’s major emitters of carbon 
dioxide, China must play a significant role and continue to fight against climate change. 
ii) New technologies  
The promotion of new technologies could, on the one hand, boost demand and spur innovation, which 
could act as new growth drivers as old ones such as real estate3 and globalisation fade out. It is critical to 
prioritise the right technologies and to provide strong policies and the right kind of finance to support 
technology development. On the other hand, as technologies advance, there could be major potential 
disruptions and risks to labour markets, in particular when accompanied with the development of 
artificial intelligence and automation. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure a just transition and that 
vulnerable groups are not left behind. 
iii) The Belt and Road Initiative  
The current official description4 of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is viewed by some as vague and 
ambiguous (e.g. Ang, 2019). This ambiguity has sometimes enabled speculative activities to be carried 
out under the name of BRI and is generating some distrust of BRI in some quarters. It is important for 
China to manage the BRI brand globally. This means defining the concept of BRI, narrowing its priorities 
and clarifying its scope, building corresponding datasets and sharing information with BRI countries. In 
addition, BRI countries have their own strategies and priorities for development: while China can be a 
helpful partner to cooperate with, it will not decide the future of their economies. BRI is most likely to 
succeed and endure as a transparent and understanding partnership among participating countries. 
iv) Other challenges 
Other challenges include China’s changing geo-economics around the world, continued uncertainties 
around trade and investment, and domestic economic structural changes. These should form the focus 
of short- or medium-term policies. The short-term impact of the Covid-19 virus layers on additional 
challenges while also creating opportunities to rethink ways of working. 
What should China’s new growth story look like as it addresses these challenges? 
China’s new growth story in the medium to long term should be: 
i. sustainable, which means offering the next generation opportunities at least as good as those 
available to the current generation;  
ii. inclusive, addressing emerging challenges, promoting innovations and creating opportunities for 
all; 
iii. low-carbon, which requires actions on climate change, targeting a net-zero-carbon economy 
within several decades; 
iv. market-oriented, offering a fair and transparent investment climate for the private sector. 
 
 
                                                
3  See Chivakul et al. (2015) for an explanation of the role of residential real estate and how it has been a key driver of growth in 
China. 
4  The Chinese government’s online Belt and Road portal describes the BRI initiative as “a development strategy and framework, 
proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping that focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries primarily between 
China and the rest of Eurasia” (2016; see: What is “Belt and Road” initiative? at https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/cjwd/ 
2757.htm). In 2019 the concept evolved to “an initiative for peaceful development and economic cooperation, rather than a 
geopolitical or military alliance; a process of open, inclusive and common development, not an exclusionary bloc or a ‘China 
club’” (see The Belt and Road Initiative Progress, Contributions and Prospects at https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/ 
86739.htm). 
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Sustainability 
China’s new forms of growth can and should be sustainable and this will depend on the quantity and 
quality of four types of capital that are central to wellbeing and wealth: human, social, physical and 
natural capital (Stern, 2015; Hamilton and Hepburn, 2017; Managi and Kumar, 2018; Lange et al., 2018). 
While the expansion of physical capital has been central to China’s economic growth in the past, recent 
years have seen a deepening understanding of the dangers for the other three forms of capital of badly-
designed, low-quality or polluting physical capital. Such capital can reduce or destroy natural capital, for 
example by polluting soil and water and damaging forests. Damage to natural capital can undermine 
human health and result in many deaths, reducing, damaging or destroying human capital. Further, 
damage of this kind to natural and human capital can create tensions that undermine social capital. In 
the meantime, technical progress, which applies to all four capitals and to their combination, has an 
important role to play as it is a contributor to productivity growth (Fagerberg, 2000). 
Inclusivity 
The new growth strategy should also be inclusive and it must embrace a world that is changing very 
rapidly: with new technologies taking hold, particularly artificial intelligence and automation (Adams, 
2018), with the challenges of climate change, and with new threats to world trade. There will be 
disruptions and risks to be managed as well as great opportunities in innovation and investment. In the 
meantime, it must be emphasised that there are opportunities to be created for all in answering these 
challenges, reducing inequality and promoting social cohesion in the process. 
Low-carbon 
In stressing the importance of the transition to the low-carbon economy and the growth and job 
opportunities it presents, we should also recognise that the target within 30 to 50 years must be a net-
zero-carbon economy. This target and timeframe are necessary if the world is to stabilise temperature 
rise “well below 2°C” above pre-industrial levels. As the recent special report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has shown, a rise of 2°C embodies 
considerably more dangers than a rise of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). We should recognise that taken together, 
current Nationally Determined Contributions to the Paris Agreement, which show how countries plan to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, put the world on a path heading for 3°C or more of warming 
(Climate Action Tracker, 2019). Yet we know that going beyond 2°C would be deeply dangerous and the 
target in the Paris Agreement of keeping temperature rise “well below 2°C” is therefore wise; as a world, 
we break it at our peril.  
China is so large an emitter that if the world is to be at net zero, then so too will China have to be. For 
this to happen, China needs to undertake an urgent review of all investments in long-lived fossil 
infrastructure that might outlast a 30- to 50-year time horizon (Pfeiffer et al., 2018).  
Market-oriented 
Private firms are a crucial source of the creativity and new ideas that higher quality, high-tech and 
sustainable growth require. Lardy (2014) argues that almost all of the growth in urban employment in 
China since 1978 was the contribution of private firms. The innovations and investments of the coming 
decade will also be driven in large measure by the private sector. Therefore reforms should be market-
oriented in ways that encourage that initiative and creativity: in other words, public policy, public 
institutions and public investment should work to create an investment climate for the innovations and 
investments of the new era.  
 
  
 8 
2.  High-quality and sustainable growth in a  
changing world 
China has always looked ahead to chart the next stage of reforms, as the economy and technology 
advance, as challenges appear, and as the world changes. We argue that the next set of reforms is of 
special significance, not only for China but also for the world. 
The growth story of the coming decades will be one that progresses beyond the standard economic 
models in which growth is shaped largely by physical capital. That approach reflected the Harrod-Domar 
idea that the growth rate is the investment rate (I/Y) divided by the incremental capital–output ratio 
(I/∆Y) (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946). The growth story in the 21st century, if it is to be sustainable and 
capable of prospering in a changing world, must be based on a balanced and complementary 
accumulation of several forms of capital. In terms of outcomes, China will likely focus on wellbeing 
broadly understood, rather than narrowly on output, and, in achieving broader goals, will emphasise 
higher productivity and resource efficiency.  
In 2005, China’s State Council issued a policy paper, Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Development of a Circular Economy, which recognised the economic and environmental risks of the 
nation’s heavy resource exploitation (State Council, 2005). In 2008, the circular economy Promotion Law 
was issued by China, defining the circular economy as the “reduction, reuse, and recycling (3R) activities 
in the production, circulation, and consumption of products” (see Global Legal Monitor, 2008). A whole 
chapter in the country’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–10) was devoted to the circular economy and it was 
then selected and upgraded to a national development strategy in the 12th Five-Year Plan of 2011–15 
(Mathews and Hao, 2016). There, environmental and economic development were linked in a single 
policy instrument, with an accompanying goal of improving societal wellbeing (Geng et al., 2016).  
To provoke thought around high-quality and sustainable growth in a changing world, we examine three 
questions in this section: 
i. What are the factors at work which imply that the earlier phases of and approaches to 
development are – or should be – coming to an end? 
ii. How should the experiences of these earlier phases influence the formulation of objectives for the 
next phase? 
iii. What should be the key features of the strategies and models for the new era? 
Discussions on all these questions have begun in China and ideas are emerging.  
i) Factors causing old approaches to cease  
The old era or approach to development is coming to an end for a number of reasons. Threats to natural, 
social and human capital are being reflected in: pressures on the environment; social strains, including 
inequality; changing technologies and the need for new skills; and the demographic challenges of an 
ageing population. China faces further associated challenges that come with the country’s elevation 
through middle-income and towards higher-income status. These include: rising wages; a shift to a 
service economy; changing world economic geography and interactions; and pressures on public 
finances. 
The pressures on the environment are both local and global in origin. We know that strong global action 
is urgently needed to stop environmental degradation, and that China, because of the size of its 
economy and greenhouse gas emissions, must be a central player in climate action in particular. The 
world economy will double in size in the next two decades or so and within that China’s economy will 
more than double (Hawksworth et al., 2017). In the same period, global emissions will have to be cut by 
at least 25 per cent if the world is to have a reasonable chance of meeting the Paris Agreement target of 
limiting temperature rise to well below 2°C (see Figure 2.1). World infrastructure will likely double in 
around 15 years, much of it associated with urban expansion and a large part of that in China (New 
Climate Economy, 2016). If this new additional world economy or infrastructure looks anything like the 
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old, then cutting emissions absolutely by more than 25 per cent will be impossible, hence the need for 
radical and urgent change. Change of this nature and scale requires decisive action and strong 
leadership but the new path can be a very attractive story, with strong, sustainable and inclusive growth 
(as detailed in the New Climate Economy report of 2018). 
Inequality has been a pressing concern in China for some time: between urban and rural areas; 
regionally, including in areas with declining industries; and between individuals. In the early stages of 
reform some rise in inequality was inevitable; as Deng Xiao Peng observed, some people get richer before 
others. But over the past two decades or so, inequality has become more troubling. 
China’s wages have risen as its economy has advanced, strong investment has taken place and its 
workers have become more skilled. All this is part of China’s success but it also requires new strategies for 
the future. The era of China being the dominant world force in low-cost manufacturing is coming to a 
close, at least in low value-added manufacturing. Future technological change, with artificial intelligence 
and robotics in particular, is likely to transform investment, work, consumption and the functioning of 
cities.  
China’s demography is changing strongly. Looking ahead, the ageing population is likely to build up 
pressures on public finances and health systems. Pressures on public finances will also arise in relation to 
cities and their ability to raise revenues to finance local infrastructure.  
The world’s economic geography has changed and will continue to do so, as emerging market and 
developing countries have grown, and will grow, faster than richer ones. This implies that international 
trading patterns will change, with much more trade among emerging market and developing countries. 
This, in turn, requires stronger infrastructure linking those countries – which is the basic logic behind the 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
The increasing strength of the emerging market and developing countries is sometimes met by negative 
reaction from some richer countries. Such reactions are short-sighted and damaging to the world 
economy as a whole, and it must be hoped that they are temporary. Nevertheless, they reinforce 
arguments for stronger links among emerging market and developing countries and for looking to 
stronger internal demand. 
ii) The reformulation of objectives 
The above description of the recent phases of development, and of a changing world, points us towards 
our second question, concerning a re-examination of objectives in light of these experiences. The 
pressures on natural capital and social capital we have described imply that both fostering a better 
environment and managing inequality and social cohesion should appear strongly in societal objectives. 
A rapidly changing world, the potential dislocation arising from new technologies, and pressures from an 
ageing population all point to the importance of social security. And all of these lead us to the centrality 
of sustainability in objectives. 
As we describe the way in which these concerns have arisen from experience and as we think about 
future changes, we recognise that we have made powerful arguments for looking beyond output or 
income as the overwhelming objective. The recognition that output is inadequate as the dominant 
objective is, of course, longstanding in China and elsewhere. However, the experience of the past few 
decades has led us to be much more multi-dimensional, explicit and analytical about the expression of 
objectives. Sometimes this has been summarised under the heading of ‘wellbeing’. Though useful, this 
term is insufficient by itself, partly because it focuses on outcomes rather than opportunities. For many, 
including, for example, Amartya Sen, both outcomes and opportunities should be of concern. Sen speaks 
of ‘capabilities’ and the ability to pursue a life you have reason to value (Sen, 1999). Others have 
provided analyses in terms of ‘empowerment’ (see, for example, Stern et al., 2005). The UN Sustainable 
Development Goals emerged from these kinds of discussions and do capture the key dimensions 
associated with the environment, inequalities and opportunities. The SDGs include the functioning of 
cities, infrastructure, the state of oceans, climate, forests, opportunities for rewarding employment and 
challenges of insecurity; they are a valuable framework for thinking about and setting societal objectives. 
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iii) Strategies for the new era 
Answers to our third question on the key characteristics of strategies for the new era follow naturally 
from our discussions of the factors bringing the old era to an end. The strategy must embrace the 
challenges and opportunities of new technologies, changing economic geography and sustainability. And 
it must tackle the challenges of its public finances – China has strong spending needs associated with 
urbanisation, infrastructure, education and health – and of social security and changing demography. In 
summary, selective investment and innovation in all forms of capital, human, physical, natural and 
social, should be the central objectives. 
On technological and sectoral change, it is clear that China must now shift its balance towards more 
advanced technologies and the provision of knowledge-led services. This follows from rising wages, the 
rapid technological changes that are coming through, and demand patterns that are moving, as 
incomes rise, towards services. Shifting the balance in this way will involve strong investment in R&D and 
innovation, and in skills appropriate to this new era. It will also require management of declining 
industries and locations.  
Wu (2000) examined the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to China’s economic growth and 
broke down the TFP growth into two components: technological progress and efficiency change. Wu 
suggested that China’s economic growth in the 1980s was mainly due to efficiency improvement and 
growth in inputs. However, technological progress has become an important factor propelling China’s 
economic growth since the 1990s. Chen and Golley (2014) estimated the changing patterns of ‘green’ 
total factor productivity growth (GTFP), which incorporates carbon dioxide emissions as an undesirable 
output, and found that R&D intensity was the one factor that impacted in a highly significant and 
positive way, increasing both GTFP and TFP growth in China between 1980 and 2010. 
The speed of technological change and a slowing in the overall growth rate imply that changing the 
composition of the economy can no longer occur simply through some sectors growing more rapidly than 
others: some sectors and places will decline in the coming years. Such transitions need to be well 
managed to ensure social cohesion and economic justice. There are many ways to achieve this, involving 
training, targeted finance, appropriate location of government activities (e.g. in areas affected by 
contracting industry), and provision of adequate social protection.  
The changing pattern of activities within China – crudely speaking, ‘moving up the value chain’ – will 
require changing the relationship between China and its trading partners. Income per capita and wages 
in the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative are on average approximately half those of China. If trade 
and infrastructure links can be established, and technologies advanced and shared with these countries, 
then the countries of the BRI could play a powerful and positive role in the development of a new and 
changing international division of labour. This is analogous to the driver of change in China in the 1970s 
to 1990s being, in large measure, China advancing into the world economy through low-cost 
manufacturing and joint ventures. To some extent, China with its more advanced technologies will now 
play the role of an external partner to poorer countries.  
Climate Action Tracker (2019) suggests that total greenhouse gas emissions have to reach net-zero by 
2070 if the world is to have a reasonable chance of achieving the Paris Agreement targets. Carbon 
dioxide emissions have to reach net-zero earlier, around 2050, as suggested by the IPCC (2018). As we 
have already described, because of the size of China’s economy and emissions, China must also be close 
to zero-carbon for the world as a whole to meet this goal. Figure 2.1 shows that China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions appear to be plateauing, as a result of its past strong and impressive efforts towards efficiency 
and away from fossil fuels, and should start to decrease. China’s Nationally Determined Contribution to 
the Paris Agreement involves peaking emissions by 2030. However, it is clear from the world aggregate 
requirements that if the Paris temperature targets are to be within reach, global emissions must fall by 
more than 25 per cent in the next 20 years (UNEP, 2016). This cannot conceivably happen unless China’s 
emissions peak and start to fall strongly in the years from now. 
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Figure 2.1. China’s carbon dioxide emissions (million tonnes) from fuel combustion, 1980–2016  
 
Source: Authors using data from the International Energy Agency  
The changes to investment required to achieve a strong fall in emissions, particularly changes to 
sustainable infrastructure investment, are discussed in Section 3 below and will be covered in more detail 
by our follow-up paper (Stern et al., 2020). If carried out well, the investments, innovations and reforms 
could yield a sustainable and inclusive growth path that could be very attractive. The public finance and 
demographic elements of the plan will be of great importance and we touch on these briefly in Section 4. 
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3.  Innovation, investment and policies for the  
14th Plan  
China’s 14th Plan (2021–25) will, in large measure, chart the course for the new era in the country. This 
section provides a framework for our overview of the possibilities for the 14th Plan, building on the 
discussion in Section 2. We focus on two questions: 
i. What will be the core action areas, innovations and investments for the next phase, in particular 
in the 14th Plan?  
ii. What will be the broad policy instruments that can guide these innovations and investments?  
Our follow-up paper (Stern et al., 2020) will extend this discussion and provide more detailed analyses of 
investments in the four forms of capital, with a particular focus on the 14th Plan.  
i) Innovation and investment for the 14th Plan 
Many economists provide theoretical background that justifies intervention when there are clear market 
failures (e.g. see Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Krugman, 1987; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991). Because private enterprises cannot fully recoup their investment in R&D that is intended for public 
value, the private market lacks the incentive to invest in these areas, and there is little active role for 
public financing of innovation. As a result, it is important to identify the areas that policymakers should 
give particular attention.    
The key areas for investment and innovation in China will be: 
• New technologies that can give high-quality growth  
• Modern service sectors, including health, education, transport, communications and IT, finance, 
and logistics  
• The functioning of modern cities, including in their infrastructure and in relation to pollution, 
congestion and efficiency  
• Food and land-use systems.  
In the new era, overall resource productivity and efficiency will be crucial and there is real potential in the 
idea of the circular economy with its emphasis on design for re-use and recycling. Resource efficiency 
and productivity are not only powerful forces for growth but also crucial elements for the protection of 
natural and human capital. 
Investment in the four key capitals – human, social, physical and natural – must move to centre stage in 
the 14th Plan, as a natural evolution of the direction that China has taken in recent years. China has 
already begun to embrace an approach to growth and development that embodies a focus on the 
quality and quantity of these four types of capital, as it reflects on its experience and deepens its 
understanding of wellbeing. Recent years have also seen increasing emphasis on, and growing 
understanding of, the close connections between these different capitals.  
ii) Policy measures for the 14th Plan 
Policy will need to be designed to further strengthen the role of the market in the allocation of resources. 
For markets to work well in guiding investment and innovation, governments must analyse and act on 
market failures. Key areas of potential intervention for the Chinese government, which would support 
innovation and strong and sustainable investment, include: 
• Greenhouse gas emissions and pollution 
• Under-provision of R&D 
• Capital market failures 
• Network externalities in grids, public transport, broadband/ICT 
• Information on opportunities, including technologies, in a changing world.  
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Further, government policies must have the predictability and institutional strength to provide the 
necessary confidence for investment. There may be increasing challenges in China of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic positions in both the public and private sectors, which could hinder innovation and growth. 
Lessons for BRI countries and the world 
One final point on overall strategy involves China’s lessons for the world. The reform period of the past 
four decades has brought remarkable success in raising incomes and reducing poverty. It is unique in 
human history. But it has also brought stresses and problems. If China had been able to look ahead more 
clearly to the problems of congested and polluted cities, it might have made policy and investments 
differently. 
Many of the Belt and Road Initiative countries are now where China was two decades ago in terms of 
income per capita. If in two decades’ time they have similar income per capita to China now, and if their 
economic structure of fossil fuel use looks like China’s now, the world would be headed for temperature 
increases well beyond 3°C and the catastrophic consequences that would involve. The 126 BRI countries 
(as of April 2019)5 excluding China together accounted for 28 per cent of global emissions in 2015. 
However, this share could grow to 66 per cent by 2050 if BRI countries maintain growth trajectories while 
the rest of the world follows a 2oC mitigation pathway (Ma et al., 2019).  
Given China’s role in the BRI, it has a real and vital opportunity to help these countries move towards a 
much more sustainable, more efficient and greener form of development. China can share its experience 
and lessons, employ its technological and financial strengths, and help invest beyond its borders in the 
new models of growth and development, to the great benefit of all. 
All this emphasises very strongly that the 14th Plan and the BRI have to be understood together. Of 
course, China can and will shape the 14th Plan directly but it does not determine the development 
strategies of these countries or other countries that may become part of the BRI in the future. Each 
country will shape and decide on its own strategy, but China can be a source of guidance and 
investment as well as a supportive partner. This is an interesting and important feature of the new era. 
China must work on its 14th Plan and take its decisions with careful thought over how its BRI partners will 
be taking theirs, and what forms the partnerships will take. 
  
                                                
5 www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng//zgyw/t1657223.htm 
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4.  Driving change through systemic reforms 
We have described the reasons why China’s current phase of development and reform is coming to an 
end and a new era of growth and development is beginning. The reasons include the successes (such as 
rising wages and skills) of earlier periods, the problems or pressures of those periods (including in relation 
to the environment, to inequality and to its public finances), and a changing world in terms of 
technology, economic geography and international economic relations. The way forward is shaped by an 
understanding of those reasons and by a deeper approach to development objectives, going beyond the 
primacy of the growth of income.  
The new growth path will embody higher quality, cleaner, more efficient and more sustainable 
consumption and production, and more inclusive and cohesive economies and societies; and lead 
towards a stronger ‘ecocivilisation’ with economic activities that are more in harmony with the natural 
environment. All of this will require innovation and investment in four types of capital: human, physical, 
natural and social. 
Six areas for reform  
In the preceding section we emphasised innovation, investment and policies for the 14th Plan. In this 
concluding section we describe some economy-wide reforms that foster and promote the new growth 
strategy as a whole. While we discuss elements of the systemic reform package separately, the reforms 
we set out are complementary and interwoven. Taken together, they describe a Chinese model of 
institutions and policies for the passage to a high-income country and a harmonious and cohesive 
society.  
We examine six areas in turn: price, regulation and enterprise reform; financing investment in the four 
forms of capital; public finance and the functioning of cities; internal governance including the quality of 
institutions; the management of radical change and dislocation; and global governance of trade, the 
international financial institutions and the global commons.  
i) Price, regulation and enterprise reform 
Rapid and efficient change towards growth that embodies high quality, high-tech, service-orientated 
sustainability will require clear price signals. If private sector investment and innovation are to be 
fostered within a strong and sound investment climate, then both price signals and regulation should 
take account of the potential market failures discussed in Section 3.  
An example would be a strong carbon price, and thus it is important to make sure the new carbon 
markets work well. This could include possible consideration of carbon price floors and carbon taxes. But 
carbon prices do not by themselves re-design cities, reduce congestion or promote compactness. Nor do 
they by themselves ensure that products, systems and buildings are designed in a way that the 
components can be re-used or recycled. These key features will require direct public action for the design 
and reform of cities, including regulation and standards. Further, reform is also likely required for state-
owned enterprises so that they are not sites of inefficiency or kept alive artificially when their activities or 
methods of work are obsolete. China will be dependent on creativity and entrepreneurship in the new era 
and a clear, sound, transparent and supportive investment climate is crucial.  
ii) Financing investment in the four forms of capital 
Investment in all four forms of capital will require a combination of private and public finance. The nature 
and combination of these finances will be a vital part of systemic reform and will range from bank loans, 
angel investments and crowd-funding for small enterprises, to capital markets for major private sector 
firms to raise debt and equity finance, and to large-scale finance, including development banks, for 
large-scale infrastructure projects. Sustainability and green finance can be an important part of the 
story. So too will be major mortgage, insurance and pension institutions as Chinese individuals and 
households buy houses and plan for old age.  
Transparency, sound banking standards and regulation of individual institutions and the system as a 
whole will be of increasing importance in the financial sector. As the sophistication of the economy and 
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financial system grows, the danger of financial crises increases. Crises cannot be wholly avoided but their 
probability, intensity and impact can be reduced by sound investment decisions, coherent policy and 
strong institutions. Investment, and especially overinvestment, in unproductive infrastructure carries 
severe risks to economic and financial stability. This can be alleviated by careful assessment of 
infrastructure costs, their financing structure and the actual benefits they generate. Sound, sustainable 
investment criteria can be strengthened and their use mandated. Their widespread application could 
help avoid the problem of ‘building more’ instead of ‘building right’. Wise regulation is of great 
importance, for both avoiding the problems of excessive risk-taking and of the potential distortions and 
risk of directed credit.  
iii) Public finance and the functioning of cities 
Public finances can also be a source of instability and crisis. China has managed the national public 
finances responsibly over the years but serious problems could emerge, and arguably have emerged, at 
lower levels, particularly in cities. Cities will be the focus of most of the investments, particularly 
infrastructure investments, of the new era. They are home to the majority of the population and account 
for the big majority of output, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions and their relative importance will 
grow. How cities are managed in physical, human, social, environmental and financial terms will 
therefore be critical to China’s future.  
For cities to create a stable investment climate and to carry through the infrastructure and other 
investments necessary to function in a clean, efficient and sustainable way, their public finances must be 
managed well. To do this they will need strong revenue streams from local taxation and payments for 
services. Local taxation can take a number of forms, including taxation of land and property, pollution or 
carbon taxes, local additions to income tax and so on. It is important that these taxation powers are 
clear and well-executed, and are not contradictory or confusing relative to taxation by national 
authorities. Transparency and efficiency of local taxation, as well as expenditures, will be crucial to the 
delivery of the next stages of China’s development.  
It is also important that the design, taxation and infrastructure of cities foster compactness. At present, 
China’s cities are sprawling, creating severe problems of congestion, pollution and waste (NCE, 2018).  
iv) Internal governance 
The functioning of cities constitutes a major part of the investment climate but good governance, 
particularly in relation to investment, goes beyond cities. Private investment is at the heart of the growth 
model of the new era and it is very sensitive to the quality of governance, as well as the quality of 
infrastructure services. The quality of governance has a profound influence on how easy it is to get things 
done and the confidence of the investor in the returns to investment.  
We identify three elements of the quality of governance in relation to investment: the soundness of 
policies; the predictability of policies; and the functioning and behaviour of institutions. We have already 
discussed in Section 3 the meaning of sound policy in the new era, particularly as regards getting 
markets to give better signals, by overcoming market failures. Predictability reduces government-
induced policy risk. Such risk is a major deterrent to investment round the world. We do, of course, learn 
over time about new possibilities; new evidence appears; experience teaches lessons: thus policy cannot 
be set in stone. But if investor uncertainty is to be managed, the criteria for policy change must be 
understood and, as far as possible, be set out in advance. Government policy should be ‘predictably 
flexible’.  
Another source of both cost and uncertainty in China lies in the functioning and behaviours of 
institutions. Sometimes institutions and officials can be bureaucratically heavy or obstructive; sometimes 
they are corrupt. The more licences and permissions that are required, the greater the likelihood that 
these problems or obstacles can arise. In creating a good investment climate, it is important that bad or 
unnecessary intervention is reduced. That does not mean, of course, abandoning regulation and 
standards, for example on pollution or safety. The argument here is that government should focus on the 
important and make the application of the regulation and standards as user-friendly as possible.  
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v) Management of radical change and dislocation 
Major change inevitably involves some dislocation. Such issues arise more strongly now that China is an 
established producer in many sectors. Some of these sectors will contract in the future, such as coal-
mining, steel and some of low-cost manufacturing. The impact might be particularly large in specific 
geographical locations. This type of change, if badly managed, can damage social cohesion and create 
lack of hope or a sense of injustice.  
There are a number of actions that both national and local government can take. Key elements include: 
training and retraining; support and finance for local entrepreneurship; moving mobile government 
activities to the affected localities; help for workers in relocating; and social safety nets. Local dialogue 
(i.e. involving stakeholders including citizens locally) can contribute strongly to the effective working of 
these policies. 
Certainly, the changing nature of technologies and of the world economy will involve some future 
dislocations. We can be sure that financial shocks will occur round the world and probably in China too. 
Rich countries have managed these kinds of changes badly on the whole, and the political consequences 
have been very damaging. China can learn from their mistakes.  
vi) Global governance 
Our final subject on systemic reform concerns global governance. As the world’s largest economy (in 
purchasing power parity terms), China is already a major influence on the world stage (even though its 
per capita income is still considerably lower than many rich countries’). China not only acts on the world 
stage: inevitably, it also shapes that stage. What happens to world trade and investment, to the global 
commons and to the future of the international financial institutions is of vital importance for China and 
the world. On all these, the world as a whole, including China, will benefit greatly from a well-
functioning, rules-based and equitable world order.  
On trade and investment, the extraordinary growth and development of the past 70 years globally has 
demonstrated the great benefits of collaborative and open international systems. Since such systems 
began to be created in the late 1940s, global output per head has gone up by a factor of four and global 
life expectancy at birth has increased by around 30 years, from around 40 to 70 years. This has been a 
unique period for development in world history.  
It is vital that these international systems are maintained and enhanced (see, for example, Stern, 2018) 
and China has a crucial role to play here. Moving from a world with one dominant power, the United 
States, to a bipolar world with the United States and China in tension or antagonism would be 
damaging. It is unsurprising, therefore, that we see public discussion of the Thucydides Trap6 (see, for 
example, Allison 2017). An open and international order with all countries participating will be much 
more productive than a system dominated by quarrelling between two major powers. An open, rules-
based order would allow the world to tackle much more effectively the new problems of the 21st century 
while continuing to lift people out of poverty. Working on further opening of trade within the World Trade 
Organization and supporting the UN organisations are vital.  
The challenges of the global commons, particularly climate change, are of great urgency, as we have 
argued. China played a leading role in creating the Paris Agreement, at COP21, in 2015. China has begun 
to stabilise its carbon emissions and has committed to peak its emissions around 2030 or earlier. At the 
2019 UN Climate Action Summit, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) released a review 
on the effect of policies addressing climate change and strengthened China’s position on reducing 
emissions (MEE, 2019). It will likely begin to reduce them under the 14th Plan. China is now, inevitably, in 
the vanguard of action and international collaboration on climate change and this presents it with great 
opportunities, not only in terms of its own new model of growth and its technological advances but also 
in terms of global leadership.  
Finally, the world’s international institutions – the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, the regional development banks, the WTO and so on – will increasingly look to China for 
leadership. China’s role in the G20 will be crucial – it exemplified this through its Presidency in 2015 and 
                                                
6 Where a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one and the fear of this happening leads to war. 
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the Hangzhou Summit. As the report of the G20 Eminent Persons Group argued, the IMF is in urgent 
need of more resources if future financial crises are to be better managed and their frequency is to be 
reduced (G20 Eminent Persons Group on Financial Governance, 2018). The multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) could be still more effective if they functioned better as a group. That would involve the 
creation of country platforms for better coordination of action in support of a country’s development 
programme. China, which is increasingly important as a supporter of development in other countries, 
could play an important role here. It would also involve countries and MDBs working together for the 
management of risk to get stronger multipliers for private investment. And it would involve bringing 
sustainable infrastructure to the core of all the work of the MDBs.  
The combined value of these reforms 
This brief discussion of systemic reforms has covered: policy and sustainable infrastructure to create an 
investment climate to foster private sector innovation and investment; strengthening the financial 
system for strong, productive and stable financing; better functioning cities, including their public 
finances; local governance and global governance. Together, these systemic reforms could generate the 
investments in physical, human, national and social capital which will drive forward China’s new era of 
high-quality, sustainable and inclusive growth and development.  
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